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Brown: The Judicial Role in Criminal Charging and Plea Bargaining

THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN CRIMINAL
CHARGING AND PLEA BARGAINING
Darryl Brown*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The standard answer to the question of what role judges have in
determining the appropriateness of criminal charges is “virtually none.”
On the one hand, it is “the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial
Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions.”1 On the other, at least
with respect to the fairness of charges that are the basis of prosecutions,
the scope of judicial authority is quite limited, because prosecutorial
charging discretion is “almost limitless”2 and “[g]overnmental
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive
function.”3 Most state justice systems follow the federal constitutional
model, under which “the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”4 It could
hardly be otherwise, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested, because
decisions to prosecute are “ill-suited to judicial review.”5 With only
modest qualifications, much the same is said about the judicial role in
plea bargaining. Plea agreements are closely bound up with charging
decisions—they often involve dismissing some charges or substituting
* O.M. Vicars Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
2. State v. Kenyon, 270 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Wis. 1978).
3. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 246 (2008) (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693).
5. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also United States v.
Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Prosecutorial discretion resides in the executive,
not in the judicial, branch, and that discretion, though subject of course to judicial review to protect
constitutional rights, is not reviewable for a simple abuse of discretion.”). Commentators have long
made the same point. See, e.g., Newman F. Baker, The Prosecuting Attorney: Legal Aspects of the
Office, 26 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 647, 647-48 (1936) (“[T]he initiation of criminal
prosecution is a matter resting in the uncontrolled discretion of the prosecuting attorney . . . [and]
not subject to legal control except in the extreme instances of official misconduct.”); Robert H.
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 (1940) (“The prosecutor has
more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America. His discretion is
tremendous.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1525 (1981).
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one charge for another, and partly for that reason the judges’ role often
remains largely “passive.”6 The parties negotiate terms for a criminal
judgment that they then present to the judge, whose role is confined to
confirming a factual basis for the plea, the knowing voluntariness of
the defendant’s plea, and (depending on the sentencing law and the
terms of the parties’ agreement) exercising some discretion in dictating
the sentence.7
But this standard story misleads and omits nearly as much as it
accurately conveys. It is true only in a narrow sense. Courts and lawyers
have been misled because they construe this account of prosecutorial
authority and judicial impotence too broadly, and because many
overlook that state law sometimes departs significantly from the federal
model in this area. With regard to federal constitutional law that governs
both state and federal criminal justice, it is true that the judiciary has
only a very limited mandate under due process doctrine to intervene in
decisions to prosecute (much less decisions not to prosecute) and over
party negotiations about guilty pleas.8 But courts are not barred from
exercising some oversight of criminal charging—or charge adjustments
and dispositions in plea negotiations—as a requirement of separation of
powers jurisprudence, which means that Congress could grant federal
judges a greater supervisory role and provide statutory criteria on which
they could meaningfully do so.9 The same seems to be true under most
state constitutions.10 Beyond that, as a matter of law and policy, the
executive has not always had exclusive authority over charging, or over
negotiating charges to reach a plea bargain, in every state.11 Nor are
courts excluded from having a hand in any aspect of charging and
negotiating about charges under current law in some states.12 It is true,
however, that as a general description of state criminal justice policy,
prosecutors have by far the largest role and judges usually play a very
modest role in supervising them.13 This is largely due to legislatures in
many states choosing not to establish greater checks and balances over
6. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
THE GUILTY PLEA 51 (1981).

7. Id. at 47.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Parts II–III.
10. For an unusual state court holding that separation of powers bars a legislature from giving
courts discretion that infringes on prosecutorial charging authority, see Padget v. Padget, 678 P.2d
870, 873 (Wyo. 1984) (“[T]he charging decision is properly within the scope of duty of the
executive branch . . . .”). For a similar view, see State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn.
1996) (Coyne, J., dissenting).
11. See infra Parts II–III.
12. See infra Part III.B.
13. See infra Parts II–III.
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criminal charges by authorizing and encouraging courts to play a greater
role, and because courts have generally chosen not to exercise—or to use
only modestly and rarely—what authority they do have under existing
statutes, rules, and doctrines.14 And it is especially misleading with
respect to state criminal justice systems, where the vast majority of
prosecutions occur and some of which depart in notable ways from the
judge’s role in the federal criminal justice system.
This Article’s primary goal is to provide a compact synthesis of the
law that authorizes, defines, and regulates judicial authority regarding
decisions whether to file criminal charges, which charges to file, and
how charges might be adjusted in the plea bargaining process. Part II
focuses on judicial power with respect to initial charging and noncharging decisions.15 Whether judges have a role with respect to criminal
charging depends on which aspect of charging one is concerned about—
or put differently, what problem or risk in prosecutorial decisions judges
could be called upon to address.16 Where it is granted by statute, judges
have clear authority to assure that prosecutions do not proceed if charges
are not grounded on a minimally sufficient factual basis.17 Judges in
approximately one-third of state justice systems have the additional
power to dismiss factually well-grounded charges if they conclude doing
so is “in the interest of justice.”18 By contrast, judges have no power in
many state or federal courts to address prosecutors’ decisions not to
charge a suspect with a specific offense, although there are notable
exceptions—a few states do grant judges some power in this context.19
This power is closely tied to rules about whether judges have the power
to initiate criminal charges independently of prosecutors.20 In some
states, under the right circumstances, they do.21 Additionally, judges
have clear, albeit functionally very weak, authority to address the
problem of biased prosecutions, that is, charges filed by prosecutors for
improper reasons.22 Part III considers judicial power over charging in the
plea negotiation context, that is, once charges have been filed.23 Judicial
power can be significant with respect to assuring that particular charges
lead to a just outcome that is appropriate on the facts of the case,
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.1.
See infra Part II.A.4.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.1.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See infra Part III.
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although judicial authority varies here depending on the nature of the
problems judges might seek to address.24 Judges certainly can reject
proposed plea bargains if they conclude the disposition is either too
lenient or too harsh.25 Their power to fashion a just outcome can be
constrained, however, by sentencing laws and by limits on their ability
to compel more severe charges or accept guilty pleas to lesser ones. The
power of some state judges to dismiss charges sua sponte in the interest
of justice extends to this stage as well.26 From this survey of existing law
and practice, two basic themes emerge. The first belies much of the
standard story about the judicial powerlessness over criminal charging,
at least in some states, as a matter of constitutional law.27 The second
identifies the sources of law that make that standard story a largely
accurate one in the many jurisdictions.28 Where that is so, it is due
predominantly to judges’ own reluctance about—or aversion to—
exercising greater authority over charging, and in some places, to
legislative policy constraining that authority, rather than to any
limitations from constitutional law or from the common law and
adversarial process traditions.29
II.

JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OVER CRIMINAL CHARGING

A. Judicial Authority to Dismiss Criminal Charges
As a first step in understanding judicial authority over “criminal
charges,” it is useful to distinguish the power to initiate, alter, and stay
or dismiss charges. Possessing only one of these powers can give an
actor a considerable, if not determinative, role in criminal charging. And
in fact, states allocate these powers between judges and prosecutors in
different and overlapping ways. Overwhelmingly, police and prosecutors
control the filing of criminal charges in state criminal justice systems, 30
as they do in common law systems worldwide (and indeed, in most
European civil law justice systems as well).31 But judges also have some
power to approve private requests for criminal charges in many states

24. See infra Part III.B.1.
25. See infra Part III.B.1.
26. See infra Parts II–III.
27. See infra Parts II.A.1–2, III.A.
28. See infra Parts II.A.3–II.B, III.B.
29. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
30. See Baker, supra note 5, at 647-48; Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 1525. For brevity, I will
not distinguish charges filed by police from those filed by prosecutors, because both are charging
decisions by executive branch law enforcement agencies.
31. See Baker, supra note 5, at 669.
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independently of any action by public prosecutors.32 Likewise, both
prosecutors and judges have power to dismiss previously filed charges,
sometimes—depending on the state—independently of the other’s
approval.33 And both have functionally similar powers to stay (or halt,
temporarily or indefinitely) a prosecution from proceeding.34 In this
Subpart, I map the diversity and scope of judicial power with respect to
criminal charging.35 Related judicial power over charging in the context
of plea negotiations is reserved for Part III.36
1. Dismissing Charges Due to Factual Insufficiency
One limited check judges provide on prosecutors’ decisions to file
charges is review of the factual bases for the prosecutors’ allegations.37
Judges must confirm that the government has sufficient evidence to
support a finding of probable cause or to make out a prima facie case.38
But this role for judges is a modest and limited one. The evidentiary
standard is low, so prosecutors are rarely unable to meet it.39 Moreover,
federal constitutional law does not require a judicial determination of
factual sufficiency for criminal charges in state courts, and the law in
many states does not either. While defendants who are arrested on a
warrant or detained after a warrantless arrest have the federal
constitutional right to a judicial determination of probable cause,40 the
Constitution does not require that criminal charges in state courts be
screened by either a grand jury or a judge at a preliminary hearing.41
32. See infra Part II.B.1.
33. See infra Part II.B.
34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.135 (2017) (stating that “any court may stay imposition or
execution of sentence” and impose intermediate sanctions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-17 (2017)
(“If a party injured appears before the court in which a trial for the commission of a public offense
is to be had, at any time before the trial, and acknowledges that the party injured has received
satisfaction for the injury, the court, on payment of the costs incurred, may order all proceedings to
be stayed upon the prosecution and the defendant to be discharged therefrom . . . .”); State v.
Lattimer, 624 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that a stay of adjudication is a
sentence for which prosecutor consent is not required).
35. See infra Part II.A.1.
36. See infra Part III.
37. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-19 (1975).
38. See id.
39. See Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 83 (2010).
40. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of
probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.”).
41. See id. at 118-19 (holding that the Federal Constitution does not entitle an accused “to
judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute” and that “a judicial hearing is not
prerequisite to prosecution by information” in state court); see also Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S.
541, 545 (1962) (same); Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (“[T]he ‘due process of law’
clause does not require the State to adopt the institution and procedure of a grand jury . . . .”);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not
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However, eighteen states require grand jury screening of felony charges,
as does the Fifth Amendment for felony charges in federal courts.42
Those jurisdictions also give defendants a post-arrest right to a
preliminary hearing, although that right is mooted by a grand jury
indictment, since it amounts to a finding of probable cause independent
of the prosecutor.43 The remaining majority of states do not require
grand jury indictments (except for capital charges in some), but state
constitutions or rules generally provide for a post-arrest preliminary
hearing.44 In many of these states, however, prosecutors can preempt this
form of judicial oversight by filing charges with the court before the
hearing.45 At least two states have abolished the preliminary hearing
altogether and thus permit prosecutors to directly file charges without
judicial oversight;46 although these states and a few others that allow
direct indictments without preliminary hearings allow defendants to
move for dismissal if discovery fails to support the prosecution’s prima
facie case.47 In sum, while judges in some circumstances can dismiss
criminal charges for lack of a sufficient factual basis, this is a modest,
reactive power relevant only in relatively unusual instances.
2. Dismissing Charges Due to Impermissible Charging Motives
Judges have much clearer nominal authority under the Federal
Constitution to dismiss criminal charges based on improper prosecutor
motivations for filing charges, but the restrictive standards for these
doctrines leave judges with very little meaningful authority, arguably
negligible power in practical terms. Formally, equal protection and due
process doctrines empower (and require) judges to provide a remedy for
charges motivated by improper prosecutorial bias. Judges should dismiss
require grand jury indictments in state courts).
42. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 750-51 (5th ed. 2009).
43. Id. at 751.
44. Id. at 752-53; see, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 30; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 10; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 7; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 17.
45. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 42, at 752; see, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.133(b)(1) (stating that
a criminal defendant has a post-arrest right to preliminary hearing within twenty-one days if not
charged); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.2(4) (stating that a defendant has a right to preliminary hearing unless
charged by information or grand jury indictment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-10-105 (2017)
(requiring court approval); WASH. CRIM. R. CT. LTD. 3.2.1(g)(1) (“When a felony complaint is filed,
the court may conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused has committed a felony unless an information or indictment is filed in superior
court prior to the time set for the preliminary hearing.”).
46. See, e.g., VT. R. CRIM. P. 12(d)(1) (allowing defendant to move for dismissal if discovery
shows prosecution lacks prima facie case); State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1976).
47. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 42, at 753; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4); VT. R.
CRIM. P. 12(d)(1); State v. Case, 412 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Knapstad, 729
P.2d 48, 51-52 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).
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charges motivated by vindictiveness,48 retaliation for exercising First
Amendment or other fundamental rights,49 or racial bias.50
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has defined exceedingly high
standards for finding any of these improper purposes for a prosecutor’s
charging decision.51 Successful claims of racially biased charging in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause appear to be nonexistent;
successful claims for charges motivated by vindictiveness or in
retaliation for exercising constitutional rights are exceedingly rare.52 One
reason for crafting the due process doctrines so deferentially to
prosecutors is that more restrictive limitations on charging decisions
could restrict plea bargaining practice. The core mechanism of plea
bargaining, after all, is that prosecutors adjust charges depending on
whether defendants exercise or waive their constitutional right to trial.53
More generally, both the equal protection and due process branches of
this anti-bias principle are constrained by the judiciary’s consistent—and
arguably excessive—deference to executive branch control of the
reasons for and substance of criminal charging.
3. Dismissing Charges Due to Other Prosecutorial Misconduct
Judges also have authority to dismiss charges for egregious
prosecutorial misconduct.54 Generally, this takes the form of defendants
showing that a prosecutor reneged on a promise not to prosecute and
thereby induced the defendant to divulge incriminating information
pursuant to what the defendant took to be an immunity or nonprosecution agreement.55 This authority, however, is a means to address
48. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1974). But see United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 376-81 (1982) (imposing a stringent “actual vindictiveness” requirement for
prosecutorial vindictiveness claims); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978) (holding
that there is no constitutional violation when prosecutor increases charge severity after defendant
declines a plea bargain offer).
49. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).
50. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).
51. See id. at 463-66.
52. See, e.g., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610; Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384; Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at
365.
53. See, e.g., Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382; Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364-65. In both, Goodwin
and Bordenkircher, the U.S. Supreme Court is clearly cognizant and protective of prosecutors’
desire to drop charges when defendants agree to plead guilty and add charges (or decline to drop
some) when defendants exercise trial rights. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382; Bordenkircher, 434
U.S. at 364-65.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1993). Federal courts have
inherent supervisory power to dismiss, at least if “no lesser remedial action is available.” See United
States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Barrera-Moreno,
951 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1991)).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 622 F. App’x 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming
dismissal of indictment issued after government entered non-prosecution agreement with
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prosecutor misconduct, rather than the substance, justness, or
appropriateness of the criminal charge.
4. Dismissing Charges in the Interest of Justice
At common law, judges had no independent power to dismiss
criminal charges; the power of nolle prosequi rested exclusively with the
prosecutor.56 But fairly early on, state legislatures rejected this
traditional rule and replaced it with statutes that gave judges various
degrees of authority over dismissals.57 Most jurisdictions now require
the trial judge to approve a prosecutor’s request to dismiss a criminal
charge. New York may have been the first state to adopt this approach
when it granted courts authority over nolle pros in 1829.58 A substantial
minority have gone further. In eighteen states, judges have some power
to dismiss criminal prosecutions on their own initiative—that is, absent a
prosecutor’s request or despite her opposition.59 Fourteen states,
including California and New York, permit judges to dismiss charges on
their own initiative if they conclude doing so is in the interest of
justice.60 Four additional states, following the Model Penal Code,61
defendant); United States v. Mark, 795 F.3d 1102, 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissing
indictment after government failed to prove defendant breached earlier immunity agreement); see
also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 42, at 728-29 (discussing remedies when government reneges on a
promise to the defendant). The prosecutor’s breach or bad faith is critical. A legal violation such as
an illegal arrest is not grounds for dismissing a prosecution or overturning a conviction. See, e.g.,
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520, 523 (1952).
56. Power of Court to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss Prosecution, 69 A.L.R. 240 (1930),
Westlaw (database updated 2017).
57. Id.
58. See MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA BARGAINING: A
TRUE HISTORY 35 (2005) (nothing that in 1829, New York still used private and judicially
appointed prosecutors). See generally Power of Court to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss
Prosecution, supra note 56 (providing a broad overview of state nolle pros laws). Federal practice
also requires judges to approve prosecutors’ motions to dismiss charges. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 43(c); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 16.6(b), (d); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1385(a), (c)(1) (West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54–56 (2017); IDAHO CRIM. R. 48(a)(2); IDAHO
CODE § 19-3504 (2017); IOWA R. CIV. P. 2.33(1); MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-13-401(1) (2015); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.40, 210.40 (McKinney 2017); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 815 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (c), (d) (2015); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25(d), (a); VT. R.
CRIM. P. 48(b)(2); WASH. CRIM. R. CT. LTD. J. 8.3; see also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 34a, § 247(b)
(2017).
61. The Model Penal Code provides the following:
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct
charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds
that the defendant’s conduct:
(1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negatived by the
person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining
the offense; or
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permit judges to do the same on the perhaps more limited ground that
the defendant’s conduct constituted only a de minimus violation of a
criminal offense.62 In a few more states, case law recognizes an inherent
judicial power to dismiss charges without statutory authorization.63
It is fair to say, however, that courts have collectively rejected—or
deprived themselves—of the authority and responsibility that these
statutes can be plausibly understood to give to them. Most state courts
have interpreted their power under these statutes exceedingly narrowly,
so that they overwhelmingly defer to prosecutorial preferences about
whether cases should proceed or be dismissed.64 New York’s statute is
somewhat more restrictive of judicial power than analogous laws in
other states. It provides that charges “may be dismissed in the interest of
justice . . . when . . . required as a matter of judicial discretion by the
existence of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance
clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the
defendant . . . would constitute or result in injustice.”65 Courts have
concluded that this power must be “‘exercised sparingly’. . . that is, only
in rare cases.”66
(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the
law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the
condemnation of conviction; or
(3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as
envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense.
The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under Subsection (3) of this Section
without filing a written statement of its reasons.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
62. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-236 (2016); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 12 (2017); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2C:2-11 (2017); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 312 (2017); see also 9 GUAM CODE ANN.
§ 7.67 (2017); State v. Fitzpatrick, 772 A.2d 1093, 1096-97 (Vt. 2001) (holding that “seriousness of
the charges” does not preclude an “in furtherance” dismissal).
63. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 54 Cal. Rptr. 409, 414-15 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); People v.
Lenz, 703 N.E.2d 971, 972 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); State v. Boehmer, 203 P.3d 1274, 1277 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2009); State v. Odom, 993 So. 2d 663, 677-78 (La. Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth v.
Thurston, 642 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Mass. 1994); State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tenn. 1978).
But the majority view among state courts seem to be that courts lack this inherent authority. See,
e.g., People v. Stewart, 217 N.W.2d 894, 897-900 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that there is no
inherent judicial power to dismiss charges).
64. Valena E. Beety, Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629, 652-59
(2015) (surveying laws in several states, notably New York, that narrowly construe judicial power
to dismiss charges on interest-of-justice grounds); Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L.
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2017) (same).
65. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(1) (McKinney 2017) (applying to information or
misdemeanor complaints); see also id. § 210.40(1) (applying to felony charges by indictment).
66. People v. May, 953 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting People v. Quadrozzi,
863 N.Y.S.2d 455, 463 (App. Div. 2008)). For examples of narrow applications, see People v.
Marshall, 961 N.Y.S.2d 447, 453-54 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that dismissal is not justified by
defendant’s age, likelihood of death in prison, or prior military and public service); People v.
Schellenbach, 888 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that dismissal based on

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7

72

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:63

The choice to construe this statutory power narrowly—and thereby
effectively rejecting much of their capacity to assure justice through
making independent dismissal decisions—carries across many states.
The language of these interest-of-justice statutes varies; some permit
dismissal for “good cause”67 or “substantial cause.”68 Washington’s
statute is now confined to dismissals for “governmental misconduct” or
prejudice to a defendant’s rights that undermine the possibility of a fair
trial.69 Even when rules clearly provide courts with broad discretionary
power to dismiss, however, courts often reject that power, in effect, by
interpreting their authority to dismiss exceedingly narrowly.70
California is a notable exception. Courts there have embraced a
stronger conception of the judiciary’s statutory power to dismiss charges
in the interest of justice. The California Supreme Court has stressed that
“[t]he judicial power must be independent” of prosecutors in making
decisions about dismissals on those grounds.71 Notably, California courts
use this power to strike allegations of prior convictions in “furtherance
of justice” so as to avoid having to impose unjustly harsh mandatory
sentences under the state’s three-strike laws.72 In the main, however,
judicial response to the grant of authority that these statutes represent is
disappointing. Few other bodies of law or patterns of decision making
demonstrate so clearly the collective avoidance by U.S. judges of an

prosecution misconduct must be reserved for “exceptionally serious misconduct” (quoting N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1)(e))); People v. Sherman, 825 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App. Div. 2006)
(holding that dismissal is not justified by defendant’s serious health problems); People v. Miller,
963 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (Yates Cty. Ct. 2013); People v. Vurckio, 619 N.Y.S.2d 510, 512-13 (Crim.
Ct. 1994) (citation omitted) (“[A] motion to dismiss in the interest of justice should be granted only
when a miscarriage of justice would result from strict adherence to the letter of the law.”); and
People v. Stern, 372 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (Crim. Ct. 1975) (stating that dismissals in the interest of
justice should be granted only when an “overriding moral issue” is present). Federal courts have
construed their power under FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) narrowly as well. See, e.g., United States v.
Smith, 55 F.3d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706, 710-11 (4th Cir.
1983); Dawsey v. Virgin Islands, 931 F. Supp. 397, 401-02 (D.V.I. 1996). A key rationale for
deference is that, if judges declined a request to dismiss, they would effectively be ordering
prosecutors to litigate charges that they no longer wish to prosecute.
67. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401(1) (2015).
68. See, e.g., UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25(a).
69. WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 8.3(b); see, e.g., State v. Michielli, 937 P.2d 587, 592-96
(Wash. 1997) (holding that the interests of justice warranted dismissal of trafficking charges, which
were added to original theft charge only three business days before trial).
70. The original language of WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 8.3(b) gave courts wide authority to
dismiss, authorizing dismissals simply on the court’s “own motion in the furtherance of justice,” as
long as the judge gave written reasons. Michielli, 937 P.2d at 592. But Washington courts construed
this power very restrictively in a series of cases, and rule drafters subsequently amended the rule to
incorporate the limitations created by case law. See Roberts, supra note 64.
71. People v. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131, 142 (Cal. 2013).
72. See Beety, supra note 64, at 647-48 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 2015)).
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active role, consonant with separation of powers principles—the value of
checks and balances between branches—in assuring just criminal law
enforcement and punishment.
B. Judicial Power to Initiate Criminal Charges
What about judicial power when prosecutors do not file criminal
charges? The issue can arise in two distinct contexts. The first occurs
when private individuals seek to file a criminal complaint directly,
perhaps without prosecutors ever having considered the allegation and
made a decision about whether criminal charges are merited.73 The
second arises when prosecutors consider evidence of a crime but decline
for some reason to file charges.74 In the first scenario, courts might
approve a private citizen’s criminal complaint.75 In the second, courts
might review the public prosecutor’s declination decision, typically at
the request of an alleged victim.76 If judges in either scenario rule that
charges should be filed, the problem arises of whether a judge can either
order a public prosecutor to press the case or authorize someone else to
prosecute it.
1. Judicial Initiation of Charges
Many states give judges the authority to approve criminal
complaints (as well as warrant requests) filed by private citizens.77 Given
that judicial approval of charges is not required to commence a
prosecution in most jurisdictions, this process represents a modest
version of judicial power to initiate a criminal case independently of the
prosecutor’s office. This is surely a remnant of procedures, common in
the nineteenth century in some states, in which judges approved private
prosecutions handled by victims’ private attorneys.78 In most states, it is
73. See infra Part II.B.1.
74. See infra Part II.B.2.
75. See infra Part II.B.1.
76. See infra Part II.B.2.
77. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-303, 15A-304 (2016) (stating the requirements from
criminal summons and arrest warrants); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 4(A)(1), 7(A) (providing that a judge can
make a probable cause finding on a private complaint, but a felony charge can issue only from a
grand jury).
78. For accounts of private prosecutions in the first half the nineteenth century in which
judges played an active supervisory role, see MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 58, at 28-40
(describing New York courts with private prosecutors and, prior to 1847, judicial or gubernatorial
appointments of public prosecutors); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880, at 24-69, 152-57 (1989) (describing private
prosecutions, screened by aldermen acting as magistrates, and creation of elected district attorney’s
office in 1850); Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 571-72
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solely up to the prosecutor’s office whether to file charges or otherwise
allow private criminal complaints to proceed. If they choose not to,
prosecutors can request or dictate their dismissal.79
In a few states, however, legislatures have granted judges review
over prosecutors’ decisions to press charges.80 Colorado, Michigan,
Nebraska, and Pennsylvania all have similar statutes that authorize
judges to review public prosecutors’ decisions not to charge based on
private criminal complaints.81 Each state requires prosecutors to provide
reasons for declining to prosecute in certain kinds of cases.82 State law
empowers trial judges to assess prosecutors’ discretionary declination
decisions, and those explanations provide a basis for judicial review of
prosecutorial decision-making. If judges find the decision unmerited,
they can order that the prosecution proceed, either by compelling the
public prosecutor to litigate it or by appointing a special prosecutor.83
(1984) (stating that private prosecutions predominated in the colonies); and see also Stewart v.
Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 198 (1878) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“[E]very man in the community, if he
has probable cause for prosecuting another, has a perfect right, by law, to institute such prosecution,
subject only, in the case of private prosecutions, to the penalty of paying the costs if he fails in his
suit.”); and State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d 696, 700-01 (Wis. 1989) (describing the
history of courts having sole power under state law to initiate charges until 1945, after which judges
and prosecutors shared that power).
79. Nearly every state has abolished private prosecutions, meaning privately initiated criminal
complaints prosecuted by a victim’s private lawyer without a public prosecutor’s involvement. See,
e.g., Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99, 101-07 (1875) (holding that there is no longer a right to private
prosecution); State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. 1977) (same); State v.
Harrington 534 S.W.2d 44, 49-50 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (same); People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d
1005, 1007 (Crim. Ct. 1991) (same). But some states continue to permit privately paid attorneys to
be the lead or secondary prosecutor if the public prosecutor approves. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:23–
9(d), 7:8–7(b); State v. Harton, 296 S.E.2d 112, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that a private party
is allowed to prosecute only with the state’s approval); State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507, 512-13
(N.C. 1984) (stating that public prosecutor must remain in continuous control of the case); State v.
Best, 186 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (N.C. 1972) (same); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 24-27 (Va.
1985) (holding that private attorneys may assist prosecution with permission of the court and the
commonwealth attorney); see also 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys § 12 (2017) (discussing
state authority permitting private attorneys to assist public prosecutors); cf. Erikson v. Pawnee Cty.
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002)
(holding that there was no due process violation because the private attorney assisting the
prosecution did not “control . . . critical prosecutorial decisions”).
80. See Samuel Becker, Judicial Scrutiny of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Decision Not to
File a Complaint, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 749, 753-56 (1988).
81. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
82. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-209 (2017) (“The judge of a court having jurisdiction
of the alleged offense, upon affidavit filed with the judge alleging the commission of a crime and
the unjustified refusal of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute any person for the crime, may require
the prosecuting attorney to appear before the judge and explain the refusal. If . . . the judge finds
that the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute was arbitrary or capricious and without
reasonable excuse, the judge may order the prosecuting attorney to file an information and prosecute
the case or may appoint a special prosecutor to do so.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (2017) (“[I]f,
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In one sense, this procedure looks familiar. It is a classic structure
of checks and balances on the government’s decision about a criminal
charge—a decision in which alleged victims have a direct, substantial
interest, in addition to the generic public interest in criminal law
enforcement. On the other hand, this scheme is radical, because U.S.
judges and legislatures normally grant extreme deference to
prosecutors.84 And judging from appellate reports, it seems that courts
may have continued that tradition under these statutes. There is little
published evidence of courts using this statutory power to overrule
prosecutors. It may be that they are presented with few plausible
challenges to prosecutors’ declination decisions. But it is also the case
that, as they do in the context of dismissals in the interest of courts,
appellate courts direct trial judges to give great deference to prosecutors
when exercising this power to second-guess non-charging decisions.85
upon examination, the court is not satisfied with the [prosecution’s] statement, the prosecuting
attorney shall be directed by the court to file the proper information and bring the case to trial.”);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (2017) (“[I]f, upon such examination, the court shall not be satisfied
with the [prosecution’s] statement, the county attorney shall be directed by the court to file the
proper information and bring the case to trial.”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 506(B)(2) (requiring prosecutors to
give reasons for declining to prosecute a criminal complaint filed by a private party and permitting
“the affiant [to] petition the court of common pleas for review of the decision”); see also State ex
rel. Clyde v. Lauder, 90 N.W. 564, 569 (N.D. 1902) (“[T]he more modern rule, and that adopted in
this state, is the reverse of that at common law. In this state, while the prosecutor may file with the
court his reasons for not filing an information . . . it is the province of the court to determine the
ultimate question whether the case shall be prosecuted or dismissed.”); cf. Olsen v. Koppy, 593
N.W.2d 762, 765-67 (N.D. 1999) (citing Lauder 90 N.W. 564 with approval). See generally Becker,
supra note 80 (discussing Wisconsin law). By contrast, under federal separation of powers doctrine,
courts cannot compel prosecutors to prosecute a case. See United States v. Greater Blouse, Skirt &
Neckwear Contractors Ass’n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (“Even were leave of
Court to the dismissal of the indictment denied, the Attorney General would still have the right
to . . . in the exercise of his discretion, decline to move the case for trial. The Court in that
circumstance would be without power to issue a mandamus or other order to compel prosecution of
the indictment, since such a direction would invade the traditional separation of powers doctrine.”).
84. Generally victims have no standing to challenge non-prosecution decisions. See Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-19 (1973) (rejecting private plaintiff’s challenge on federal
equal protection grounds to state policy of prosecuting only married men for failures to pay child
support, and concluding that “in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”); see also Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (extending Linda R.S. to hold that private citizens have no
“cognizable interest” in process by which magistrates decide whether to issue warrants on criminal
complaints); cf. Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-83 (2d Cir. 1973)
(rejecting purported crime victims’ request that court order prosecutors to charge); Malley v. Lane,
115 A. 674, 676 (Conn. 1921) (stating that prosecution is controlled exclusively by public officials
and victims have no standing to challenge); State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn. 1996)
(holding that absent evidence of selective or discriminatory intent or abuse of prosecutorial
discretion, the judiciary has no power to interfere with prosecutorial charging authority).
85. See Genesee Cty. Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 215 N.W.2d 145, 147 (Mich.
1974) (implying that judges should defer to prosecutor requests to dismiss absent clear reasons not
to); see also People v. Morrow, 542 N.W.2d 324, 326-28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
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2. Indirect Supervision when Prosecutors Decline to Charge
Aside from the handful of states that authorize judicial review of
prosecutors’ decisions not to charge, courts in other states have some
capacity to respond to prosecutors’ decisions not to charge through bar
discipline or similar supervisory authority. Problematic prosecutorial
conduct tends to take two forms—either a prosecutor consistently
refuses to enforce certain types of offenses, or a prosecutor refuses to
charge in specific cases for reasons that appear plainly unfounded. In
either scenario, state law sometimes empowers courts to suspend a local
prosecutor from his position or remove him from office altogether.86 In
the wake of such cases, judges may also be able to appoint a substitute
attorney to prosecute specific criminal charges.87 Elsewhere, the
governor or attorney general can take over a case from a local
prosecutor.88 A separate strategy is that state judges can use professional
disciplinary rules as a basis for looking into and responding to
prosecutorial abuse of charging discretion.89
III.

PLEA BARGAINING AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO ASSURE JUST
CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS

Reviewing prosecutors’ decisions to charge or not to charge in light
of public policies and resources is only one aspect of criminal
prosecution. The judicial role is on stronger legal footing after the

decision whether to dismiss rape charge after complainant recanted is in prosecutor’s discretion).
86. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnston v. Foster, 3 P. 534, 537 (Kan. 1884) (stating that public
prosecutor who neglects to perform his duties can be removed from office); State ex rel. McKittrick
v. Graves, 144 S.W.2d 91, 97-98 (Mo. 1940) (removing elected local prosecutor from office for
failing to prosecute certain offenses and noting that “a prosecuting attorney may not close his eyes
to notorious law violations”); State ex rel. McKittrick v. Wymore, 132 S.W.2d 979, 988 (Mo. 1939)
(removing elected local prosecutor from office for failing to prosecute certain offenses); In re Voss,
90 N.W. 15, 19-22 (N.D. 1902) (suspending local attorney for declining to enforce gambling
offenses and noting that “the state’s attorney’s failure to act in such cases is not excused on the
ground that public sentiment is hostile to the enforcement of the law, or that convictions are difficult
to obtain on account of such sentiment”).
87. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-16-06 (2017) (stating that when “the state’s attorney has
refused or neglected to perform any of the duties prescribed in [the code] . . . . the judge
shall . . . [a]ppoint an attorney to take charge of such prosecution”).
88. In New York, the governor has discretion to order the State Attorney General to take over
a prosecution from a locally elected prosecutor. See Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1013-15
(N.Y. 1997) (citing N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3; and then citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney
2017)).
89. See Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for
Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y, Dec. 2016, at 1, 7-11. See
generally Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy
for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 143 (2016).
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prosecutor’s charging document has been filed and the court thus has
jurisdiction.90 Holding aside the trial process that is relevant to only a
small percentage of criminal cases and in which juries often have the
primary decision-making role, the question is how judges carry out their
responsibility “to do justice in criminal prosecutions”91 that are resolved
by party-negotiated dispositions. The short answer is that judges have
relatively little legal basis for policing the fairness of party negotiation
tactics—in particular, prosecutors’ tactical conduct—in the plea
bargaining process. The U.S. Supreme Court has sharply constrained any
basis in federal constitutional law for active judicial oversight of
attorney behavior in plea bargaining, and the law in many states is little
different.92 But judges retain the final word on whether to accept plea
bargains proposals offered by the parties.93 They can reject those
proposals as unjust or inconsistent with the public interest.94 They also
have responsibility for assuring a proper legal and factual basis for a
judgment based on a guilty plea, although judicial inquiry into those
grounds is often in practice more modest than it could be.95 The
remainder of this Part fleshes out this basic picture.96
A. Constitutional Bases for Judicial Oversight of Plea
Negotiations and Agreements
One might think that constitutional due process doctrine gives
courts a basis for actively scrutinizing the fairness of plea agreements as
well as prosecutors’ bargaining tactics employed to reach those
agreements. Nominally, it does. In Santobello v. New York, the U.S.
Supreme Court concluded that there were constitutional limits on plea
bargaining practice.97 Negotiated guilty pleas are constitutionally
permissible, but due process principles “presuppose fairness in securing
agreement between an accused and a prosecutor.”98 Courts must ensure
that plea bargains are “attended by safeguards to insure the defendant
what is reasonably due in the circumstances.”99 Courts should “vacate a
90. Once trial begins, judges have unreviewable power—as a matter of double jeopardy
doctrine—to acquit defendants of some or all charges even before the prosecution has presented all
of its evidence. See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
91. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
92. See infra Part III.A.
93. See infra Part III.B.
94. See infra Part III.B.
95. See infra Part III.B.
96. See infra Part III.A–B.
97. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-63 (1971).
98. Id. at 261.
99. Id. at 262.
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plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained.”100 Santobello
strongly suggested that judges have an affirmative obligation to ensure
the fairness of plea bargaining.101
Following Santobello, federal courts began to define due process
requirements in this context more specifically, “both to protect the plea
bargaining defendant from overreaching by the prosecutor and to insure
the integrity of the plea bargaining process.”102 Courts examined
prosecutorial conduct to ensure that they met the “most meticulous
standards of both promise and performance . . . in plea bargaining.”103
Some required prosecutors to create records of their discretionary
decisions in order to give courts a basis for review. For example, when
prosecutors promised that they would consider mitigating factors before
making their sentencing recommendation, the Seventh Circuit required
that “the Government’s evaluation of the specified mitigating factors
must be set forth in the record at the time of sentencing” even though
that “evaluative function [is] normally performed internally within the
office of the prosecutor.”104 Other courts supervised prosecutors’
performance in similar ways, such as requiring supporting arguments
from prosecutors on sentencing recommendations in an effort to ensure
promises were not fulfilled only pro forma or half-heartedly.105 Courts
needed prosecutorial decision making to be on the record so judges
could confirm the government fulfilled its promises.106
Courts also took Santobello’s statement that guilty pleas must be
fairly obtained to mean that prosecutors should be held to higher
standards in plea bargaining than private parties are in ordinary contract
100. Id. at 264 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
224 (1927)).
101. Id. at 262-63.
102. See United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1978).
103. Id. (quoting Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973)); see also
Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[F]undamental fairness and public
confidence in government officials require that prosecutors be held to ‘meticulous standards of both
promise and performance.’” (quoting Correale, 479 F.2d at 947)).
104. Bowler, 585 F.2d at 854.
105. See Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 870-72 (5th Cir. 1975) (ordering prosecutors
to make strong recommendations to the Parole Board as well as to the Department of State against a
defendant’s extradition to fulfill promises made in a plea bargain); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d
375, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding that when the prosecutor promised to recommend a particular
sentence, the mere half-hearted recitation of the recommended sentence without reasons for
supporting it breached the plea agreement); Correale, 479 F.2d at 947 (“[T]he most meticulous
standards of both promise and performance must be met by prosecutors engaging in plea
bargaining.”).
106. Bowler, 585 F.2d at 854-55 (holding that judges must be able “to ascertain whether or not
the Government had in fact performed the promised evaluation and it is not the privilege of the
Government to make the determination as to whether or not it has honored its promise”).
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negotiations.107 While offers are not ordinarily enforceable before
acceptance in ordinary contract settings, some courts concluded that due
process required that prosecutors could not withdraw a clear plea bargain
offer before a defendant had a fair chance to accept it.108 Even more
importantly, courts specified fairness requirements for the prosecutorial
practice at the heart of plea bargaining: charge manipulation. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, required prosecutors to give
reasons justifying new charges they added after a defendant rejected a
proposed guilty plea agreement.109
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually shut down the Federal
Constitution as a basis for many of these ways that judges could oversee
the fairness of plea negotiation practices.110 It expressly overturned the
Sixth Circuit’s holding that courts could review prosecutorial reasons for
charging in the course of plea negotiations.111 It tied the constitutional
law of plea negotiations closely to the law of private contract
negotiations, and it broadly discouraged courts from scrutinizing either
prosecutors’ motives and justifications or the substantive fairness of plea
agreements. Most states seemed to have taken the Supreme Court’s lead
in the interpretation of their own state constitutions.112 As a result,
constitutional law provides scant basis for judicial oversight of
prosecutors’ charging decisions or hardball tactics in plea negotiations.
Judicial power is clearly greater, however, with respect to the
substantive content of proposed plea bargains.
B. Sub-Constitutional Power to Assure Plea Bargains Serve the
Public Interest
In accord with their fundamental responsibility to assure justice in
criminal prosecutions, judges must approve plea bargains before
107. See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15-19 (4th Cir. 1979).
108. Id. In Cooper, the prosecutor offered to dismiss three of four charges in exchange for
defendant’s guilty plea and cooperation in other cases. Id. at 15. The defense counsel quickly met
with his client and called to accept the offer four hours after it was extended, but during that time, a
supervising prosecutor had vetoed the offer and so the office refused to abide by it. Id. The court
held that the offer was enforceable. Id. at 19. Private contract law generally would not enforce an
offer before acceptance, absent defendant’s detrimental reliance on the agreement. Id. at 15-17.
English law has a comparable rule that enforces some prosecution promises to victims to charge, or
promises to defendants not to charge. See ANDREW L-T CHOO, ABUSE OF PROCESS AND JUDICIAL
STAYS OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 64-68 (2d ed. 2008).
109. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1976), overruled by Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
110. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362-65.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 179 Cal. Rptr. 384, 389-90 (App. 1981); State v. Killam, 122
P.3d 439, 442-43 (Mont. 2005).
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entering judgments based upon them. Criminal procedure rules
emphasize two prerequisites for judicial acceptance of guilty pleas: the
voluntariness of the defendant’s plea, and a “factual basis” for the
plea.113 But judges have broader implicit authority to approve or reject
party-negotiated guilty pleas based on their independent determination
that the proposed disposition is inconsistent with the public interest.114
This power amounts to a check on prosecutorial charging decisions, but
of a distinctly limited sort. Perhaps more importantly, a significant
minority of states grant judges the means to exercise informal influence
with the parties as they negotiate a proposed non-trial disposition.115 In
recent years, judges in some states have taken up this more active role,
which has the clear support of policy advocates and professional
organizations such as the American Bar Association.116
1. Judicial Power over Charges at the Guilty-Plea Stage
The judicial power to dismiss charges in the interest of justice that
exists in one-third of the states extends to the plea bargain or guilty-plea
stage.117 In addition, judges in all jurisdictions have inherent authority to
reject guilty pleas as inconsistent with the public interest, although there
are practical as well as customary limits on the exercise of this power.118
As a matter of custom, judges tend to defer to dispositions that both
parties endorse.119 As a practical matter, judges can reject plea bargains
and offer reasons for doing so that provide guidance to—and thus
influence—the parties on the terms of a disposition that the court would
find acceptable.120 But they generally cannot of their own accord adjust
charges to which they will accept a guilty plea.121 It is no surprise that
judges cannot demand or file on their own a more serious charge than
those that prosecutors have filed. But judges are also often explicitly

113. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2)–(3); MICH. CT. R. 6.302(C)–(D) (2017).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 2:17-cr-00010, 2017 WL 2766452, at *1, *11-13 (S.D.
W. Va. June 26, 2017) (“It is the court’s function to prevent the transfer of criminal adjudications
from the public arena to the prosecutor’s office for the purpose of expediency at the price of
confidence in and effectiveness of the criminal justice system. . . . Because I FIND that the plea
agreement proffered in this case is not in the public interest, I REJECT it.”); State v. Conger, 797
N.W.2d 341, 352-57 (Wis. 2010) (rejecting a proffered plea bargain as not consistent with the
public interest and noting various factors courts consider in that decision).
115. See infra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
117. See infra Part II.B.2.
118. See infra Part II.B.2.
119. See Albert W. Altschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 1059, 1064-66 (1976).
120. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
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barred in the other direction as well—state law may prohibit judges from
achieving a more lenient outcome without prosecutors’ consent by
accepting a guilty plea for lesser-included charges.122
This limitation is one contribution to the more general
asymmetrical structure of judicial power over charges in this setting.
Aside from the judicial power in some states to dismiss a charge in the
interest of justice, judges have more discretion to reject charges in
proposed plea bargains on public-interest grounds because they are too
lenient than because they are too harsh. This is because prosecutors’
initial charging decisions set an implicit baseline for judicial authority
regarding guilty pleas (they set no such baseline for prosecutors
themselves, who are generally free to file additional charges). Judges can
and do reject plea bargains because the parties have proposed to dismiss
too many charges (or the wrong charges) as part of a negotiated plea
deal.123 That is, they can rule that the bargain is too lenient for the court
to approve, judged against the initial charging document and the
evidence in support of it. But judges are on much thinner ground if they
want to reject bargains as against the public interest because a defendant
has agreed to plead guilty to all filed charges, even if the judge views
those as too severe in light of the defendant’s conduct.124 To describe the
law of judicial authority in this context differently, judges’ power over
plea bargains is generally structured more as a check against prosecutors
departing from their initial charging decision in the direction of leniency
than as a check against unduly severe charging and plea bargain
decisions by prosecutors.125
Again, state laws vary on this point, but Michigan provides a fairly
strong example of this model. Michigan is not among the states that give
judges discretion to dismiss charges in the interest of justice, so judges
lack that tool for preventing overly severe outcomes.126 Michigan judges
are also barred from accepting guilty pleas to lesser offenses than those
122. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 6.301(D) (“The court may not accept a plea to an offense other
than the one charged without the consent of the prosecutor.”).
123. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
124. Judicial power over sentencing is different. Depending on the specifics of sentencing law,
judges may or may not have discretion to determine the sentence. At least where discretion exists
for the charge, judges can reject a plea bargain with specific sentencing term because it is either too
severe or too lenient.
125. The one qualification to that view is that judges also lack a means to respond to cases in
which they think prosecutors filed excessively lenient charges in the first place to which a defendant
has agreed to plead guilty. That amounts to a limit on judges’ power to prevent an excessively
lenient disposition, although it is a limit that really relates to initial charging stage, discussed in Part
II, rather than the guilty plea stage.
126. See People v. Stewart, 217 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that there is
no inherent judicial power to dismiss charges).
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charged without the prosecutor’s agreement.127 On the other hand,
Michigan is one of the small number of states that gives judges a more
intrusive form of authority over prosecutorial discretion: judges have the
power to order prosecutors to bring a case to trial if the judge is not
satisfied with the prosecutor’s reasons for deciding not to prosecute.128
Together, then, this suggests that Michigan policymakers are not averse
to judges playing a substantive role in charging. Instead, they are averse
to the risk of undue leniency from either judges or prosecutors. To guard
against that, they have designed a system in which the interaction of
executive and judicial power operates as a check against one branch
opting for unduly lenient charging options.
2. Informal Judicial Influence over Charge Adjustments in
Plea Bargains
In the guilty-plea stage, judges’ formal power over charges tends to
be quite limited in most states.129 But one avenue for informal judicial
power seems be growing, at least moderately. A significant number of
states (including Michigan) have given judges a means to participate in
the plea bargaining process that permits them to influence the justice of
negotiated outcomes.130 The traditional rule bars judicial involvement in
the parties’ plea negotiation process, and many states continue to adhere
to that policy.131 But a notable number of states have now abandoned
that rule in favor of granting judges explicit authority to play an active
role in the bargaining stage.132
State law varies on the precise terms of judicial intervention. In
Arizona, “[a]t the request of either party, or sua sponte, the court may, in
its sole discretion, participate in settlement discussions.”133 A similar
North Carolina statute provides that “[t]he trial judge may participate in
the discussions.”134 Oregon law grants judges statutory comparable
authority to “participate in plea discussions . . . . [w]ith the consent of
the parties and upon receipt of a written waiver executed by the

127. MICH. CT. R. 6.301(D).
128. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (2017).
129. See Rishi Raj Batra, Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute Resolution
Perspective, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 565, 573-77.
130. See id. at 594-95.
131. See id. at 573-77.
132. See id. at 578.
133. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a) (“The trial judge shall only participate in settlement discussions
with the consent of the parties. In all other cases, the discussions shall be before another judge or a
settlement division.”).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1021(a) (2016).
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defendant,” as well as to comment on the parties’ proposed bargains.135
Rules in Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, and Vermont are
much the same.136 Other states, such as Missouri, expand the judicial
role a bit more modestly.137 Judges remain excluded from participating
in the parties’ plea discussions, but once the parties reach a consensus
the judge “may discuss the agreement with the attorneys including any
alternative that would be acceptable.”138 California and Maryland law
are similar.139
Evidence suggests that judges in some jurisdictions have taken up
this opportunity in ways that allow them to meaningfully shape case
outcomes. Nancy King and Ron Wright recently conducted an extensive
survey of judicial practice in several states that authorize judicial
involvement in the pretrial and plea negotiation process.140 They found
that many judges mandate that parties meet early in the pretrial process
to discuss discovery and possible plea agreements, and in many cases,
judges were actively involved in discussing settlement options.141
Perhaps the primary utility of this judicial survey was to improve the
“efficiency” of the adjudication process, generally measured by how
quickly cases were resolved and cleared from court dockets. But lawyers
and judges reported that judges “add[ed] new charging and sentencing
ideas” that influenced prosecutors to adjust charges and otherwise
shaped the substantive terms of plea agreements and case outcomes.142
Many judges have recognized that “in talking with the parties, they
would suggest dispositions or conditions of probation that neither party
135. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.432(1)(a), (2), (5) (2015). The parties can also request participation
of a judge other than the one who would preside at trial. Id. § 135.432(1)(b).
136. Compare IDAHO CRIM. R. 11(f)(1), and MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) (“The judge may
participate in plea discussions at the request of one or both of the parties if the discussion are
recorded and made part of the record.”), with MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.04(3), and MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-12-211(2) (2015), with VT. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1) (allowing the court to participate in plea
discussions if such “proceedings are taken down by a court reporter or recording equipment”).
137. See MO. R. CRIM. P. 24.02(d).
138. Id. One might question that this is a distinction with little difference once the parties
present some proposed disposition. After that point, the judge is free to discuss “any alternative.”
See id.
139. See People v. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131, 138-40 (Cal. 2013) (implying that trial judges
should wait until the parties have negotiated a proposed bargain before offering a view about the
appropriate sentence based on current information); see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4243(c)(1) (“If a plea agreement has been reached . . . the defense counsel and the State’s Attorney
shall advise the judge of the terms of the agreement when the defendant pleads. The judge may then
accept or reject the plea . . . .”).
140. Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 337-56
(2016).
141. Id. at 338-43.
142. Id. at 329, 364, 366-68.
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had thought about, but that they believed were appropriate for the
particular case.”143 In some localities, judges met with the parties
together or separately to facilitate negotiations.144 When they deemed it
necessary to achieve a just plea agreement, the judge’s aim would
include “trying to move the DA’s position” or convincing the state to
drop a charged sentence “enhancement or substitut[e] a charge that
would permit the desired disposition.”145 Prosecutors reported that
judges played a useful role in identifying weaknesses in the
prosecution’s case that led them to adjust charges or other plea bargain
terms.146 Judges themselves “noted that their involvement can help to
reach a more just resolution when they are concerned that inexperienced
defense attorneys are going astray.”147
This kind and degree of judicial involvement in plea bargaining
appears still to be the minority approach across state criminal justice
systems.148 But the American Bar Association recommends rules that
give judges a more active managerial role in the pretrial process, notably
by mandating an early-stage conference with the parties,149 and scholarly
commentators are nearly unanimous in endorsing more substantive
judicial involvement to improve the accuracy and justice of convictions
based on plea agreements.150 More to the point, this informal mode of
influence, through a managerial or facilitative role that addresses the
efficiency as well as the justice of adjudicative process, is the approach
to judicial activism in criminal charging to which American
policymakers—judges, legislators, and rule drafters—are most
amenable. The most promising and politically (or culturally) feasible
143. Id. at 368.
144. Id. at 351-55.
145. Id. at 352-53 (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 367-68.
147. Id. at 367.
148. For a survey and assessment of state law on this point, see Batra, supra note 129, at 57279, 573 nn.53-55, 574 nn.56-64, 575 nn.65-72, 576 nn.73-78, 577 nn.79-85, 578 nn.86-92, 579
nn.93-98, 580 nn.99-100.
149. See HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AM. BAR. ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION 102D, at 2 (2010).
150. See, e.g., King & Wright, supra note 140, at 392-96; Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the
Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2042-52 (2006)
(urging revision of federal criminal procedure rules to expand discovery, reduce waivers of
procedural rights, and require judges to conduct more rigorous plea hearings); Susan R. Klein,
Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 564-87 (2013) (recommending, inter alia,
required pre-plea discovery conferences); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 459-61 (2008) (doubting whether judicial practices fully address
procedural unfairness in the context of plea bargaining); Sandra Guerra Thompson, Daubert
Gatekeeping for Eyewitness Identifications, 65 SMU L. REV. 593, 640-45 (2012) (urging that judges
conduct pretrial hearings on the reliability of certain kinds of evidence); Sandra Guerra Thompson,
Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
329, 375-94 (2012) (same).
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route to the judiciary providing some degree of meaningful oversight of
prosecutorial charging discretion is unlikely to come through direct
judicial review of prosecutors’ charging decisions, or through judges’
substantial exercise of their power—where it exists—to dismiss charges
in the interest of justice. As a matter of custom or tradition, most formal
judicial authority that responds directly to prosecutorial charging
decisions will be sparingly used. On the other hand, both judges and
prosecutors (as well as defense attorneys) seem much more willing to
accept judges in a facilitative, collaborative role in which they provide
information and independent evaluations that persuades prosecutors of
the wisdom of adjusting charging decisions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the judiciary has some authority and capacity to play a
supervisory role in criminal charging and plea negotiations. State rules
are quite diverse in defining the parameters of judicial supervisory
power over charging, but in the main, as a formal matter, that authority
is relatively weak. That weakness is in part a function of legislative
policymaking, but it is also in good part because courts themselves—the
U.S. Supreme Court, state appellate courts, and trial courts—have
chosen to make it that way. In the aggregate, U.S. courts have embraced
the role of the “passive judiciary”151 to a greater degree than
constitutions or legislation has required, and—for many states, at least—
to a greater degree than they did in earlier eras. That tradition and policy
preference notwithstanding, judges clearly have the professional and
institutional capacity to play a greater role in assuring justice in criminal
charging, even if they have collectively contributed to the diminution of
their own legal capacity for doing so. But avenues for that greater use of
that power remain in the laws of many state criminal justice systems,
and the need for judges to take more actively fulfill their “primary
constitutional duty . . . to do justice in criminal prosecutions”152 will
endure in all jurisdictions.

151. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6 (suggesting that judges should become more
involved in the plea bargaining process).
152. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
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